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We experimentally demonstrate optical control of negative-feedback avalanche diode (NFAD) detectors using
bright light. We deterministically generate fake single-photon detections with a better timing precision than
normal operation. This could potentially open a security loophole in quantum cryptography systems. We
then show how monitoring the photocurrent through the avalanche photodiode can be used to reveal the
detector is being blinded.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties,
Alice and Bob, to share a secret key. The first proposal of
QKD was done by Bennett and Brassard in 19831. Since
then, this field has evolved rapidly. Unlike classical cryp-
tography that makes assumptions on the computational
power of an eavesdropper Eve, security proofs in QKD
are based on the laws of quantum mechanics2,3.
However, imperfections in practical systems can open
loopholes that can be used by a malicious third party to
get some information on the key. Attacks of various types
have been proposed, for example photon number split-
ting (PNS) attack4, detector efficiency mismatch attack5,
Trojan-horse attack6, time-shift attack7. In this paper,
we are interested in a detector blinding attack, which be-
longs to the class of faked-state attacks8. In this attack,
Eve uses bright light to take control of the detectors in the
QKD system to force the outcome of the measurement
to be the same has her own. Such blinding on individ-
ual detectors has been demonstrated for single-photon
avalanche diodes (SPADs)9–13 and for superconducting
nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs)14–16.
Here, we show that negative-feedback avalanche diode
(NFAD) detectors can be controlled with bright light.
Such detectors are promising thanks to their high effi-
ciency and low afterpulsing probability17. We also show
that diode current monitoring can be used to uncover the
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TABLE I. Characteristics of our NFAD devices18.
Designation Model number Diameter (µm) Coupling
D1 E2G6 22 Capacitive
D2 E3G3 32 Capacitive
D3 E2G6 22 Inductive
D4 E3G3 32 Inductive
presence of blinding. We have tested 4 diodes made by
Princeton Lightwave18. Two of them are integrated in
a commercial single-photon detector from ID Quantique
(model ID22019) and two are used with a custom readout
circuit made at the University of Waterloo20.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
The characteristics of the four NFAD devices are given
in Table I. The electronic circuit of the detectors is shown
in Fig. 1. The coupling to the amplifier is capacitive for
D1 and D2, and inductive for D3 and D4. Under nor-
mal conditions, the NFAD works in Geiger mode, i.e.,
the avalanche photodiode (APD) is biased with a volt-
age Vbias greater than the breakdown voltage Vbr . When
a photon is absorbed, it creates an avalanche generating
an electrical pulse. This analog signal is then converted
into a digital signal by using a comparator with a thresh-
old voltage Vth. To take control of the detector, Eve
needs first to blind it so it becomes insensitive to single
photons11. To do so, she sends continuous bright light on
the APD, which then generates a photocurrent. As the
APD is connected in series with resistors R, R1, and R2
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FIG. 1. Scheme of the electrical readout. After detection of
a photon by the APD, the avalanche signal is coupled to an
amplifier (Amp) through a capacitor in ID220 or a pulse trans-
former in custom readout (Waterloo). Then it goes through
a comparator (Comp). The hold-off circuit outputs a gate
with a pre-set width. The feedback loop is used to quench
the avalanche by applying a +5 V (ID220) or +4 V (custom
readout) voltage to the anode of the NFAD for deadtime τd.
By applying this voltage, we reduce the voltage across the
APD below its breakdown voltage. R = 1.1 MΩ is a resistor
integrated into the NFAD18. In ID220, R1 = 1 kΩ and R2
= 50 Ω; for Waterloo, R1 = 1 kΩ and R2 = 100 Ω.
(see Fig. 1), the voltage across the APD will be reduced.
If Eve sends enough light she can then bring the volt-
age across the APD below Vbr and put the detector into
a linear mode. In this mode, the detector is no longer
sensitive to single photons but instead works as a linear
photodetector. Eve can now force the detector to click at
the time of her choosing by superimposing optical pulses
(trigger pulses) to her blinding laser.
To test for blinding and control, we use a setup shown
in Fig. 2. For the attack, we use two lasers at 1550 nm11.
The first laser (blinding laser) is working in continuous-
wave mode to make the detector enter its linear mode and
hence become insensitive to single photons. The second
laser is generating optical pulses of 33 ps full-width at
half-maximum (FWHM) for the tests on detectors D1
and D2 and 161 ps for the detectors D3 and D4. The
two laser signals are then combined on a 50 : 50 beam
splitter.
III. DETECTOR CONTROL
A. Blinding
First, we test our four devices to see if they are blind-
able. For that, we increase the continuous-wave opti-
cal power Pblinding arriving on the APD and we measure
the rate of detection. Once it reaches 0, the detector is
blinded. For our four devices, this happens at an optical
power of a few nanowatts and we have tested that they
FIG. 2. Experimental setup for testing blinding and control of
the detectors. The optical power of the continuous-wave laser
(CW) and the pulsed laser (PL) is adjusted using variable
optical attenuators (VOA). The pulsed laser is triggered by a
pulse generator (G). The two lasers are combined on a 50:50
beam splitter (BS). The light is sent to the device-under-test
(DUT) and to a power meter (PM).
stay blinded up to several milliwatts.
B. Forced detections
Once Eve has blinded the detector, she can send opti-
cal trigger pulses to generate electrical pulses. The am-
plitude of the signal will be proportional to the energy of
the trigger pulse Epulse. As there is a comparator in the
readout circuit, not all pulses are necessarily detected.
If the amplitude of the signal is below the comparator
threshold, no click will be registered. Therefore, by con-
trolling Epulse, Eve can force the detector to click with a
probability p ∈ [0, 1]. We can then define Enever as the
maximum energy of the optical pulse that never gener-
ates a click, and Ealways as the energy above which the
detector always clicks. To avoid introducing errors in the
key, Eve must carefully choose the energy of her pulse. In
the case of the BB84 protocol1, if Eve and Bob measure
in different bases, the pulse energy will be divided equally
between Bob’s two detectors11. In this case, Eve does not
want Bob’s detectors to click, thus she must choose her
Epulse < 2Enever. If Eve’s and Bob’s bases are the same,
all the light will be directed to one detector, which will
click with a probability p. For short distances, Bob will
expect a high detection rate. Eve must then force Bob to
click with a high probability, hence the transition region
between Enever and Ealways must be sufficiently narrow.
On the other hand, for long-distance QKD, Bob expects
a low detection rate, so Eve can afford to have Bob’s
detector clicking with a low probability.
Figure 3 shows the probability to get a detection de-
pending on the energy of the trigger pulse for various
blinding powers. For this experiment, we set the dead-
time τd of the detector at 18 µs (20 µs), which cor-
responds to a maximum detection rate of ∼ 55 kHz
(50 kHz) for detectors D1 and D2 (D3 and D4), and send
trigger pulses at a rate of 40 kHz. As we can see in Fig. 3,
there is a transition region where the detection probabil-
ity monotonically increases from 0 to 1. The changing
width of this transition region can be seen in Fig. 4 for
D1 and D2 and in Fig. 5 for D3 and D4.
For high blinding power, the detector is in the linear
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FIG. 3. Probability to force a detection as a function of the
pulse energy for (a) detector D1 with 10% photon counting
efficiency, and (b) detector D3 with 2 V excess bias above Vbr.
The measurements were made by sending trigger pulses at a
frequency of 40 kHz.
mode and the APD gain decreases with the optical power,
because the voltage across the APD drops. In order to
get the same amplitude of signal at the input of the com-
parator and get a click, we then need to increase the
energy of the trigger pulse. For low blinding power, the
detector is in the transition between the linear mode and
the Geiger mode13. In this region, the probability to gen-
erate a macroscopic signal even with a low energy pulse
is non-zero, which explains why Enever decreases when
we reduce the blinding power. As seen in Fig. 4a, when
we increase the efficiency of D1 from 10% to 20%, the
curves are shifted to the right. This is because the bias
voltage is higher for 20% efficiency hence we need higher
Pblinding to reduced the voltage across the APD to the
same value. The detector D3 exhibits a similar effect as
seen in Fig. 5a. Now, if we compare detectors D1 and D2
with the same efficiency, we see in Fig. 4b that both of
them have similar triggering energies. The main differ-
ence is in the minimum blinding power, which is higher
for D2 by a factor of 3. The detectors D3 and D4 require
higher triggering energy. This can come from the fact
that the detection threshold was set to a higher value
due to higher noise in the circuit. We also note that D4
has ≈ 14 times higher minimum blinding power than D3
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FIG. 4. Dependence of Ealways and Enever on the blinding
power. (a) Thresholds for detector D1 with 10% and 20%
efficiency (corresponding to 1.3 V and 4.1 V excess bias).
(b) Comparison of detectors D1 and D2 with the efficiencies
set at 10%.
(Fig. 5b). Thus for both pairs of detectors, higher mini-
mum blinding power correlates with larger active area.
For low blinding power, the transition is too wide for
an eavesdropper to attack the entire key in a short dis-
tance BB84 protocol10. Eve has then two possibilities:
either she increases the blinding power to have a tran-
sition region sufficiently narrow, or she attacks only a
small part of the key such that Bob’s detection rate is
not impacted21.
C. Timing jitter
Another important parameter for Eve is the jitter of
the detector’s response to her trigger pulse10. Ideally, it
should be narrower than single-photon detection jitter.
For our measurements, we use a time-correlated single
photon counting with the trigger signal for the pulsed
laser as a time reference. We perform timing measure-
ments with single photons and bright pulses. For the
Waterloo detectors, we use 161 ps FWHM bright pulses
and 147 ps FWHM attenuated pulses for single-photon
jitter measurement. Results for detectors D2 and D3 are
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FIG. 5. Dependence of Ealways and Enever on the blinding
power for the Waterloo detectors. (a) Thresholds for detector
D3 with 2 V and 5 V excess bias. (b) Comparison of detectors
D3 and D4 with the same excess voltage of 2 V.
shown in Fig. 6.
As we can see, under control, the jitter of the detection
is greatly reduced compared to single-photon detection.
Eve is then able to perfectly control in which time bin
she wants to make Bob’s detector clicks. In order to
reproduce the larger jitter of single-photon detections,
Eve can artificially increase the jitter of her bright pulses.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
One possible way to detect this attack is to monitor
the current through the APD. A monitoring circuit is al-
ready implemented in ID220. A voltage converter chip
biasing the APD has a monitoring pin giving a current
equal to 20% of the current flowing through the APD.
This current is measured using a 24-bit analog-to-digital
converter. In the actual implementation, its value is sam-
pled once per second. We have performed tests of this
current monitoring using detector D2 with τd set at 18 µs.
We have first only blinded the detector without sending
trigger pulses.
In normal conditions, the mean current through the
APD is very small since the only contribution comes from
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FIG. 6. Comparison of the jitter for the detection of a sin-
gle photon and a bright pulse. (a) Jitter of detector D2
with efficiency set at 10%. The Gaussian fits (solid lines)
give a FWHM of 33.4 ps for the detection of a faked state
(Pblinding = 7 nW, Epulse = 12.8 fJ) and 104.9 ps for the detec-
tion of single photons. (b) Jitter of detector D3 with 2 V ex-
cess bias. The detection of a faked state (Pblinding = 3.3 nW,
Epulse = 30.9 fJ) has 100.6 ps FWHM and the detection of
single photons has 271.8 ps FWHM.
avalanches due to the detection of a photon. Under con-
trol, the blinding laser forces the APD to be continu-
ously conductive. In this case, the mean current should
be greater than under normal use. This can be seen in
Fig. 7. At more than 1010 incident photons per second,
the count rate of the detector drops and reaches 0 (the
detector is blinded) while the mean current I increases
significantly.
We have then tested the countermeasure while fully
controlling the detector. For that, we used CW blind-
ing and the 33 ps FWHM pulsed laser to generate the
forced detections. In this case, we see that the mean cur-
rent through the detector is reduced and depends on the
rate of the trigger pulses (see Table II). The explanation
comes from the working principle of the detector. Indeed,
after a detection, the voltage across the APD is reduced
to limit the afterpulsing. During this deadtime (18 µs in
our case), the gain of the APD is smaller so the current
due to the blinding is reduced. This gives a mean current
5FIG. 7. Dependence of the detector D2 count rate and bias
current on the incident photon rate. Unlike measurements
done with Si detector in10, here we observe a plateau for the
count rate due to the deadtime.
TABLE II. Current values measured for detector D2 under
blinding for different efficiencies and trigger pulse rates.
Efficiency (%) Pulse rate (kHz) Current (µA)
10 40 0.87
10 50 0.38
10 55 0.15
20 40 2.39
20 50 1.23
20 55 0.71
smaller than that with only the blinding laser.
The lowest current we could reach was 150 nA by sat-
urating the detector. This is still higher than the val-
ues measured with up to 108 incoming photons per sec-
ond, which never exceed 100 nA (Fig. 7). By setting the
threshold of the current to a proper value (which would
depend on τd and detection rate), Bob can thus detect the
blinding of his detector by Eve. However this counter-
measure is only guaranteed to work provided the blinding
is continuous as in our tests, and not a more advanced
pulsed one15,22.
In order to reduce the impact of her attack on the mean
photocurrent, Eve has the possibility to take advantage
of the detector deadtime to minimize the overall illumi-
nation. Indeed, during the deadtime, the voltage across
the detector is reduced below Vbr but is still several tens
of volts and the blinding laser will unnecessarily gener-
ate a current. Hence, by stopping the blinding while the
detector is inactive and forcing the detection shortly af-
ter its recovery, we can reduce the mean current slightly
below 100 nA, making the attack hardly distinguishable
from the normal conditions. To detect these short peri-
ods of blinding and keep the system secure against the
blinding attack, a high-bandwidth measurement is nec-
essary. For that, we use an oscilloscope probe to monitor
Vbias. Due to photocurrent generated by the attack and
non-zero output impedance of the bias voltage source,
FIG. 8. Fluctuations of the bias voltage due to the detection
of a single photon (dark red oscilloscope trace) and under
the blinding attack (green and blue oscilloscope traces). For
an optimum blinding, we use the minimum blinding power
and the blinding laser is switched on just at the end of the
deadtime. For non-optimum blinding, the laser is switched
on in the middle of the deadtime and has higher power.
small voltage drops are observed at this point.
Figure 8 shows the deviation of Vbias from its nominal
value for detector D2. On each curve, we see two peaks
(one positive and one negative) separated by the dura-
tion of the deadtime. These are due to high-frequency
components of the applied quenching voltage. After the
deadtime, we see a voltage drop but only in the case
where we blind the detector. This drop comes from the
photocurrent induced by the blinding of the detector and
lasts as long as the detector is blinded. The deviation of
the voltage from its nominal value gives us then infor-
mation on the state of the detector in real time. The
detection of this voltage drop may be used to unveil the
presence of an eavesdropper even in the case of more so-
phisticated attacks such as the one proposed here, and
could give Bob information on the bits potentially com-
promised by this attack.
V. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the control of four free-running
single-photon NFAD detectors by using bright light,
which could be used to attack QKD. Mean current mon-
itoring allows us to detect the presence of continuous
blinding but might be insufficient in the case of blind-
ing with varying intensity. In the latter case, we have
shown that a high-bandwidth measurement of the cur-
rent flowing through the APD can be used to monitor
the state of the detector in real time. This is a step to-
wards constructing a hack-proof single-photon detector
for QKD.
6ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This project was funded from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 programme (Marie Sk lodowska-Curie grant
675662), NSERC of Canada (programs Discovery and
CryptoWorks21), CFI, MRIS of Ontario, National Nat-
ural Science Foundation of China (grant 61901483), Na-
tional Key Research and Development Program of China
(grant 2019QY0702), and the Ministry of Education and
Science of Russia (program NTI center for quantum com-
munications). A.H. was supported by China Scholarship
Council.
1C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Pub-
lic key distribution and coin tossing,” in Proc. IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Process-
ing (Bangalore, India) (IEEE Press, New York, 1984) pp. 175–
179.
2H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, “Unconditional security of quantum
key distribution over arbitrarily long distances,” Science 283,
2050–2056 (1999).
3P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, “Simple proof of security of the BB84
quantum key distribution protocol,” Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441–
444 (2000).
4B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor, “Quantum cryp-
tography with coherent states,” Phys. Rev. A 51, 1863 (1995).
5V. Makarov, A. Anisimov, and J. Skaar, “Effects of detector ef-
ficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Phys.
Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006), erratum ibid. 78, 019905 (2008).
6N. Jain, E. Anisimova, I. Khan, V. Makarov, C. Marquardt, and
G. Leuchs, “Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of prac-
tical quantum cryptography,” New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014).
7Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, and H.-K. Lo, “Quan-
tum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift attack
against practical quantum-key-distribution systems,” Phys. Rev.
A 78, 042333 (2008).
8V. Makarov and D. R. Hjelme, “Faked states attack on quantum
cryptosystems,” J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691–705 (2005).
9S. Sauge, L. Lydersen, A. Anisimov, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov,
“Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with
bright light,” Opt. Express 19, 23590–23600 (2011).
10V. Makarov, “Controlling passively quenched single photon de-
tectors by bright light,” New J. Phys. 11, 065003 (2009).
11L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar, and
V. Makarov, “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography sys-
tems by tailored bright illumination,” Nat. Photonics 4, 686–689
(2010).
12L. Lydersen, J. Skaar, and V. Makarov, “Tailored bright illumi-
nation attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols,” J. Mod.
Opt. 58, 680–685 (2011).
13I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar, C. Kurtsiefer,
and V. Makarov, “Full-field implementation of a perfect eaves-
dropper on a quantum cryptography system,” Nat. Commun. 2,
349 (2011).
14M. Fujiwara, T. Honjo, K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, and M. Sasaki,
“Characteristics of superconducting single photon detector in
DPS-QKD system under bright illumination blinding attack,”
Opt. Express 21, 6304–6312 (2013).
15M. G. Tanner, V. Makarov, and R. H. Hadfield, “Optimised
quantum hacking of superconducting nanowire single-photon de-
tectors,” Opt. Express 22, 6734–6748 (2014).
16L. Lydersen, M. K. Akhlaghi, A. H. Majedi, J. Skaar, and
V. Makarov, “Controlling a superconducting nanowire single-
photon detector using tailored bright illumination,” New J. Phys.
13, 113042 (2011).
17B. Korzh, N. Walenta, T. Lunghi, N. Gisin, and H. Zbinden,
“Free-running InGaAs single photon detector with 1 dark count
per second at 10% efficiency,” Appl. Phys. Lett. 104, 081108
(2014).
18M. A. Itzler, X. Jiang, B. M. Onat, and K. Slomkowski,
“Progress in self-quenching InP-based single photon detectors,”
Proc. SPIE 7608, 760829 (2010).
19ID220 infrared single-photon detector datasheet, https:
//marketing.idquantique.com/acton/attachment/11868/
f-023d/1/-/-/-/-/ID220_Brochure.pdf, visited 14 February
2019.
20N. Sultana, J. P. Bourgoin, K. Kuntz, and T. Jennewein,
“A simple photon counting module for free-running negative-
feedback avalanche diodes with active suppression of afterpulses,”
manuscript in preparation.
21L. Lydersen, N. Jain, C. Wittmann, Ø. Marøy, J. Skaar, C. Mar-
quardt, V. Makarov, and G. Leuchs, “Superlinear threshold
detectors in quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. A 84, 032320
(2011).
22M. Elezov, R. Ozhegov, G. Goltsman, and V. Makarov,
“Countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting
nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution,”
Opt. Express 27, 30979 (2019).
